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TITLES OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS
CARL N. EvERsTINE*
The Maryland Constitution contains the requirement
that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall
embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in
its title; . . . nor shall any law be construed by reason of
its title to grant powers or confer rights which are not
expressly contained in the body of the Act .... I" These
provisions have been construed probably more often than
any other part of the Constitution.
Six pages of annotations follow Section 29 of Article
3 of the Constitution in the 1939 Code, most of which have
to do with the titles to acts, and additional cases are
annotated in the 1947 Supplement. In a total of at least
152 cases the Court of Appeals has cited or construed the
constitutional requirements for titles. Opinions of the Court
have mentioned more than once the frequency with which
titles have been questioned, as in 1910 when Judge Urner
observed that the case at bar involved the fifty-eighth
time the Court had been called upon to apply this part
of Section 29 of Article 3.2
Many of the cases have involved a bona fide point, but
there are others in which rather obviously the question
of the invalidity of a title has been "thrown in" merely to
bolster the main point of the case. In several instances,
* Of the Baltimore City Bar; Assistant Director of Research, Maryland
Legislative Council. A.B., University of Maryland, 1930; Ph.D., The Johns
Hopkins University, 1938; LL.B., University of Maryland, 1947.
'MD. CONST., Art. 3, Sec. 29.
2 Worcester County v. School Commissioners, 113 Md. 305, 307 (1910).
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and with appropriate judicial restraint, the Court has
made brief comment on the weakness of an argument in
this respect.8
Oddly enough, the- last clause in the requirement
quoted above ("nor shall any law be construed by reason
of its title to grant powers or confer rights which are not
expressly contained in the body of the Act") seems never
to have been ruled upon or considered by the Court of
Appeals. All the cases concern the first and main clauses,
that "every law enacted by the General Assembly shall
embrace but one subject, and that shall be described in
its title."
I. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The first constitutional requirement in Maryland as
to titles of acts was in Section 17 of Article 3 of the Con-
stitution of 1851. The subject was not mentioned in the
Constitution of 1776, nor in any of the many amendments
to that document. Also, there was nothing about titles
in the first draft of what was to become Section 17 of
Article 3 of the Constitution of 1851, when it was presented
by the Committee on the Legislative Department to the
Constitutional Convention of 1850-1851.
The subject of titles first was raised on the motion of
Mr. Samuel Sprigg, a member of the Convention from
Prince George's County. Several different wordings sub-
sequently were proposed,4 ending with this provision in
the Constitution of 1851:
8 "The fourth ground of error is so vaguely stated that we would be
justified . .. in holding it too vague for notice . . .," said the Court in
Slymer v. State, 62 Md. 237, 243 (1884). "All this contention about the
subject-matter of the act not being described in the title to the act, is a
mere afterthought . . .," it was said in Hamilton v. Carroll, 82 Md. 326,
336 (1896). In Clark v. Tower, 104 Md. 175, 177 (1906), Judge Boyd's
opinion confessed the "inability" of the Court to understand the objection
to the title involved. "There ought not to be any serious contention that
its title was insufficient . . .," said the Court in Thrift v. Laird, 125 Md.
55, 69 (1915). "The contention that the statute is invalid because its title
does not conform to but offends section 29 of Article 3 . . . is clearly
without merit and cannot be sustained," Judge Briscoe wrote in Key v.
Key, 134 Md. 418, 421 (1919).
'Proceeding8 of the Con8titutional Convention of 1850-1851, pp. 220,
301-311.
LEGISLATIVE TITLES
"Every law enacted by the legislature shall embrace
but one subject, and that shall be described in the
title."5
At the Constitutional Convention of 1864, the Com-
mittee on the Legislative Department included the same
provision in its first report, except for changing the word
"legislature" to "General Assembly."' It was placed as
recommended into the Constitution of 1864.7
The Committee on the Legislative Department at the
Constitutional Convention of 1867 also continued this
provision in its report, making one minor change in chang-
ing "the title" to "its title." Subsequently, when the matter
came upon the floor of the Convention, Mr. Outerbridge
Horsey, a member from Frederick County, suggested as
an amendment that there be added to the section the
words "nor shall any law be construed by reason of its
title to grant powers or confer rights which are not
expressly contained in the body of the Act."' The entire
text of the matter relating to titles in the present constitu-
tion, therefore, is as follows:
"Every law enacted by the General Assembly shall
embrace but one subject, and that shall be described
in its title; ... nor shall any law be construed by rea-
son of its title to grant powers or confer rights which
are not expressly contained in the body of the Act."9
The entire latter clause, as has been said, seems never
to have been referred to by the Court of Appeals, so that
it will not be mentioned further. What is left, then, is
the dual requirement, (1) that each act have but one
subject and (2) that the subject be described in the title.
5 MD. CONST. of 1851, Art. 3, Sec. 17.
0 Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1864, p. 474.
7MD. CONST. of 1864, Art. 3, Sec. 28.
8 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1867, pp. 107, 343.
There seems to be nothing reported as to debate on the merits of the title
provisions, in Perlman's Debates on the Maryland Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1867.
MD. CONST. of 1867, Art. 3, Sec. 29.
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II. THE ORIGINAL NEE FOR IMPROVING TITLES
The recorded debates and proceedings of the several
constitutional conventions are not sufficiently complete
to give what was said, if anything, as to the need for
improving the quality of titles of legislative acts. How-
ever, the background conditions have been vividly sketched
in a number of subsequent cases involving titles, so that
the reasons for adding these title requirements to the
Constitution are easily apparent.
The classic statement is in Davis v. State, made just
three years after the title provision was first inserted into
the Constitution of 1851:
The object of this constitutional provision is obvious
and highly commendable. A practice had crept into
our system of legislation, of engrafting, upon subjects
of great public benefit and importance, for local or
selfish purposes, foreign and often pernicious matters,
and rather than endanger the main subject, or for the
purpose of securing new strength for it, members
were often induced to sanction and actually vote for
such provisions, which if they were offered as inde-
pendent subjects, would never have received their
support. In this way the people of our State, have
been frequently inflicted with evil and injurious
legislation. Besides, foreign matter has often been
stealthily incorporated into a law, during the haste
and confusion always incident upon the close of the
sessions of all legislative bodies, and it has not
infrequently happened, that in this way the statute
books have shown the existence of enactments, that
few of the members of the legislature knew anything
of before. To remedy such and similar evils, was this
provision inserted into the Constitution, and we think
wisely inserted.10
Essentially the same was said in another early case,
Parkinson v. State, in 1859:
"It cannot be doubted, that this restriction upon
the Legislature, was designed to prevent an evil, which
had long prevailed in this State, as it had done else-
where; which was the practice of blending, in the
10 Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854).
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same law, subjects not connected with each other,
and often entirely different. This was not unfrequently
resorted to for the purpose of obtaining votes, in
support of a measure, which could not have been
carried without such a device. And in bills of a
multifarious character, not inappropriately called
omnibus bills, provisions were sometimes smuggled
in and passed, in the hurry of business, toward the
close of a session, which, if they had been presented
singly would have been rejected.""
Later, in a case decided in 1884, the Court's opinion
said that
"Publicity, and a knowledge of the true effect and
operation of eyery bill brought before the Legislature,
are the great safeguards against ill-considered and
improper legislation. . . Bills are sometimes read,
especially the first time, by their titles only, and the
titles only are spread upon the journal. It is, therefore,
important that the title of a bill should never be mis-
leading."12
Chief Judge Alvey summed it up neatly in State v.
Norris:
"The objects designed to be attained by the con-
stitutional provision are two-fold: The first is to
prevent the combination in one act of several distinct
and incongruous subjects; and the second is, that the
Legislature and the people of the State may be fairly
advised of the real nature of pending legislation."13
Very recently, Judge Delaplaine paraphrased the sub-
stance of what was quoted above from the Davis case,
and cited that case, in applying the provisions of Section
29 of Article 3 of the Constitution."
III. THE DocTINE OF LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
The Court of Appeals has repeated in a number of
cases that titles to legislative acts will be declared invalid
11 Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 193 (1859).
12 Stiefel v. Md. Institution for the Blind, 61 Md. 144, 148 (1884).
13 State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 95 (1889).
11 Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 48 A.
(2d) 593, 598 (Md. 1946).
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only when clearly outside the requirements of the Con-
stitution. This is, of course, simply a particular adaptation
of the general rule that acts of a legislative body are
presumed to be valid.
One of the most striking cases to state this rule was
County Commissions v. Meekins.15 It involved a title
which Judges Bowie and Alvey in their dissent said was
"remarkable," and an utter nullity, because of embracing
a variety of subjects and of their not being described
therein. The majority, however, held that the act embraced
but one subject, and that this subject was properly
described in the title, and made this statement in their
opinion:
"While it is the duty of the courts to so construe
the constitutional provision as to remedy the evils
which were intended to be prevented, reason and
sound policy demand that when the Legislature has
enacted a system, forming but one subject, for the
good and effectual government of a county, we should
not, by technical interpretation, defeat such legisla-
tion by holding that it embraced more than one
subject."'1 6
Judge Alvey indicated more than once that he thought
the Court of Appeals was being too liberal in construing
titles. On one occasion he wrote the opinion concerning
the title of Chapter 362 of the Acts of 1888, which was
"An Act to add a new section to Article 30 of the Code
of Public General Laws, title 'Crimes and Punishments,'
sub-title 'Rivers,' to come in after section one hundred and
seventy one." "It certainly requires a very liberal construc-
tion of the constitutional provision to maintain the
sufficiency of this title.. .," he wrote. "But we regret to
say, that, in practice, a strict observance of the terms of
the Constitution has not always marked our legislation
in this respect. Many acts are passed, and often of great
importance, the titles of which are exceedingly deficient
in definite and clear description of the subject-matter of
1 50 Md. 28 (1878).
16 Ibid, 42.
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the act. But this Court has ever been reluctant to defeat
the will of the Legislature by declaring such legislation
void, if by any construction it could possibly be main-
tained.' 17
Chief Judge McSherry said in 1906 that:
"This Court has never leaned towards a narrow
interpretation of sec. 29, Art. 3 of the Constitution
and we are unwilling now after the lapse of half a
century since the decision of Davis v. The State, to
bring, by a strained construction, under the penalty
of its prohibition, statutes which are not within the
obvious evils and mischiefs, that its adoption as a
part of the organic law was designed to obviate."' 8
As evidence of its liberal interpretation of the title
clause, the Court in upholding the validity of a title in
Crouse v. State observed that "the language used is
susceptible of a meaning that brings the title into harmony
with the constitutional provision.' 19
Similarly, in a recent case, the statement was, that
"for testing conformity of a title to this constitutional
requirement, there is enjoined upon the courts a disposi-
tion to uphold rather than to defeat the enactment. '20
In Hitchins v. Cumberland it was added that the Court
has been reluctant to give the title provisions a construc-
tion which would defeat the legislative will, "unless the
Act is in clear violation of some constitutional provision."'"
Courts "must search out and follow the true intent of
the lawgiver," it was said in Parkinson v. State,22 quoting
Chancellor Kent.
There was a notable example of liberal construction,
and of searching out "the true intent of the lawgiver,"
in McLaughlin v. Warfield, in 1941. Ch. 408 of the Acts of
17 State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 96 (1889).
18 Baltimore City v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 118 (1906).
19 Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364, 372 (1917).
20 Board of Education v. Wheat, 174 Md. 314, 318 (1938). See also Bal-
timore City v. Perrin, 178 Md. 101, 112 (1940).
21 Hitchens v. Cumberland, 177 Md. 72, 79 (1939). See also McLaughlin
v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 (1941).
22 Supra, n. 11, 195.
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1941 added Section 99A to Article 39 in the Code, to follow
Section 99. According to the section numbers in the 1939
Code, however, the new section should have been lllA,
to follow 111, and Section 99 in that Code was on a subject
entirely different from that of the Act of 1941. The Court
held the title to be valid, noting as part of its explanation
that:
"The new 1939 Code was not available until late
in 1940, and the first copies went to the courts. It
was not available to the profession until the Spring
of 1941. . . . Without the new Code, the draftsman
of the Act could not well avoid the mistake which
is responsible for any confusion in the Section, and
sub-title, of this Act.' '28
The Court here was not only searching for legislative
intent, but was reconstructing a practical difficulty which
may have faced the draftsman of the act. However, the
fact that both the title and the enacting clause of Ch.
408 of the Acts of 1941 refer to the 1939 Code, rather than
to the 1935 Supplement or to the 1924 Code, throws some
doubt upon the Court's hypothesis.
IV. GENERAL STATEAENTS OF PRINCIPLE
The constitutional requirement as to titles, as has been
said, is two-fold: first, that every law shall embrace but
one subject, and secondly, that this subject shall be
described in the title. The Court of Appeals frequently
has made a general statement of the principles to be
followed in applying these provisions.
Thus, in Baltimore City v. Reitz, the Court's opinion
said that:
"If several sections of the law refer to and are
germane to the same subject matter, which is described
in its title, it is considered as embracing but a single
subject, and as satisfying the requirements of the
Constitution in this respect. While the title must
indicate the subject of the Act, it need not give an
abstract of its contents, nor need it mention the
23
'McLaugblin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 79 (1941).
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LEGISLATIVE TITLES
means and method by which the general purpose is
to be accomplished. If foreign and irrelevant, or
discordant matter is introduced, it will be re-jected .... ",24
This statement has been cited and paraphrased in a number
of subsequent opinions.25
Painter v. Mattfeldt added this statement of general
principles:
"The title, whilst it must indicate the subject,
need not give an abstract of the Act; nor need it
mention the means and methods by which the general
purpose is to be accomplished. . . . But though the
title need not contain an abstract of the bill, nor give
in detail the provisions of the Act, it must not be mis-
leading by apparently limiting the enactment to a
much narrower scope than the body of the Act is
made to compass ... ; and it must not be such as to
divert attention from the matters contained in the
body of the Act."26
Another good general statement is in the recent case
of McLaughlin v. Warfield:
"This Court has consistently held that the pur-
pose of the constitutional provision here invoked is
sufficiently complied with if the title of the proposed
legislation fairly advises the General Assembly, and
the public, of the real nature, and subject matter, of
the legislation sought to be accomplished, and in test-
ing conformity of a title of a statute to constitutional
requirements that the subject should be described in
the title, the courts are disposed to uphold rather than
to defeat the statute, and since every presumption
favors the validity of a statute, it cannot be stricken
down as void, unless it plainly contravenes a provision
of the Constitution; a reasonable doubt in its favor
is enough to sustain it."27
Baltimore City v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574, 579 (1879).
'See Catholic Cathedral v. Manning, 72 Md. 110, 133 (1890) ; Scharf v.
Tasker, 73 Md. 378, 383 (1891) ; Drennan v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 316 (1894) ;
Baltimore City v. Flack, 104 Md. 107, 116 (1906) ; Pout v. Frederick
County, 105 Md. 545, 564 (1907).
2" Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 474 (1913). See also Culp v. Chester-
town, 154 Md. 620, 625 (1928).
17 McLaughlin v. Warfield, 180 Md. 75, 78 (1941).
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The doctrine of liberal construction and of the presumption
of validity also is included here, for though it has been
discussed separately it really is part of the general prin-
ciples of applying the constitutional requirements as to
titles.
A favorite test applied in the later cases has been to
inquire whether the title put anyone who should read
it "on notice" as to the contents of the bill. In the dis-
cussion of the title involved in Thrift v. Laird, in 1915,
it was said that "every person was chargeable with the
notice conveyed by the title. '2 Dinneen v. Rider, in 1927,
uses the expression that the title in question "put every
legislator and the public affected on notice .. .29 Even
more recently, the Court has said that "the true test, in
each case, is whether the new law is sufficiently explicit
to put interested parties on notice that the thing intended
to be done by the legislature is, in fact, accomplished.""0
Another statement of this idea is in Quenstedt v. Wilson,
decided in 1937, in which the Court said that:
"When the Legislature undertakes to make any
material change in any existing law, local or general,
there should be some reference to the act to be
amended or repealed, under section 29 of Article 3
of the Constitution, so that the public may be on
notice of the contemplated alteration or repeal of
existing laws. '3 1
Again in Kimble v. Bender, in 1938, the Court held that
"the title is sufficient to put anyone interested on notice
of the subject-matter of the contemplated legislation." 2
In stressing another principle in the art of drafting
titles, the Court at least twice has suggested that they
should not be too long. In Annapolis v. State it was said
that "we should not by a technical interpretation embarrass
legislation and encumber laws with long and prolix titles. 3
Later, in Benesch v. State, Chief Judge Boyd wrote:
28 Thrift v. Laird, 125 Md. 55, 69 (1915).
29 Dinneen v. Rider, 152 Md. 343, 358 (1927).
3o Miggins v. Mallot, 169 Md. 435, 441 (1936).
31 Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 22 (1937).
32 Kimble v. Bender, 173 Md. 608, 613 (1938).
3 Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112, 119 (1869).
[VOL. IX
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"In legislating on such a subject it would be
practically impossible to specifically refer in the title
to everything that was deemed proper to be embodied
in'the act, without making the title so long that its
length might have the effect of causing those interested
to overlook the very thing they were most interested
in. It was not the design of the framers of the Con-
stitution to require a bill of particulars to be set out
in the title. '3 4
Chief Judge Sloan summed it up in a sentence when he
wrote that the title must show the purpose and object
of the act, so that "he who runs may read. 35
General statements of principle like those above, and
variations of them, have been repeated in literally dozens
of cases in the Maryland Reports. The principles of con-
struing titles, therefore, are well settled; it is only in
applying the principles to particular facts that close ques-
tions arise.
V. FoRms OF TITLES
There are three generally used styles for drafting titles;
and so far as form is concerned, any one of the three is
valid.
First, the title may contain a general description of
what the Act does, without any reference either to article
and section numbers in the Code or to prior acts on the
same subject. Secondly, it may contain such references
to article and section numbers, or to a prior act, together
with the title of the article in the Code, without any
general descriptive words. Finally, it may be a combina-
tion of these two, the typical example of which would
be a title which announces that it amends certain sections
of a particular article, followed by a short description of
what is to be accomplished. The examples given below
have all been considered by the Court of Appeals.
14 Benesch v. State, 129 Md. 505, 513 (1916).
85 State v. Christhilf, 170 Md. 586, 589 (1936).
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A. Titles giving a general
description only
The first style of title describes in general words what
the act is to do, without including any references to the
article and section numbers by which the act may be
identified in the Code. A number of such titles are illus-
trated below:
"An Act to regulate inspections in the City of
Baltimore. '"86
"An Act to raise additional revenue to pay the
debts of the State by increasing the rates of license
to ordinary keepers and traders. '8 7
"An Act to amend and alter the charter of the City
of Annapolis."38
"An Act to provide for a general valuation and
assessment of property in this State." 9
"An Act prohibiting the sale of spirituous or fer-
mented liquors in the several counties of the State,
on the day of elections."40
"An Act to incorporate the Town of Laurel in
Prince George's County."'41
"An Act to establish and endow an agriculture
college in the State of Maryland."42
"An Act to inflict corporal punishment upon persons
found guilty of wife-beating. '48
"An Act to enable the qualified voters of Harford
County to determine by ballot whether intoxicating
liquors, or alcoholic bitters shall be sold therein"44
"An Act to provide for the payment of the wages
and salaries due employees of insolvent employers. '45
"An Act to change the name of the Fidelity Loan
and Trust Company of Baltimore City, to the Fidelity
C6 Oh. 200 of the Acts of 1854; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 159 (1854).
87 Ch. 353 of the Acts of 1856; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525, 531 (1857).
38Ch. 240 of the Acts of 1867; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112, 118 (1869).
39 Ch. 157 of the Acts of 1866; Washington County v. Franklin Railroad
Company, 34 Md. 159, 163 (1871).
,0 Ch. 191 of the Acts of 1865; Cearfoss v. State, 42 Md. 403, 405 (1875).
,1 Ch. 260 of the Acts of 1870; Prince George's County v. Laurel, 51 Md.
457, 460 (1879).
,'
0 Ch. 97 of the Acts of 1856; Maryland Agricultural College v. Keating,
58 Md. 580, 584 (1882).C Oh. 120 of the Acts of 1882; Foote v. State, 59 Md. 264, 270 (1883).
"Ch. 92 of the Acts of 1882 ; 'Slymer v. State, 62 Md. 237, 243 (1884).
15 Ch. 383 of the Acts of 1888; Ellicott Machine Co. v. Speed, 72 Md. 22, 25(1889).
[VOL. IX
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and Deposit Company of Maryland, and to amend and
define the powers of said company. ' 46
"An Act to provide for the treatment and cure of
habitual drunkards."47
This type of title is not now used as frequently as
formerly, but there still are important bills having such
a title. The Budget Bill, the omnibus bequest bills, many
bond issue bills, and other special types of legislation
have as their title simply a general description of their
purpose.
B. Titles giving only a
Code reference
A second style of titles shows how the bill is to fit into
the Code, such as by naming the article and sub-title, or
by referring to a prior act of the Legislature, but except
in this indirect fashion gives no clue to its subject.
Examples of this form of title follow:
"An Act to amend Art. 95, of the Code of Public
General Laws by adding an additional section
thereto."' 8
"An Act to add an additional Article to the Code
of Public Local Laws, to be entitled Garrett County.""9
"An Act to add a new section to Article 30 of the
Code of Public General Laws, Title 'Crimes and
Punishments,' sub-title 'Rivers,' to come in after sec-
tion one hundred and seventy-one. '5 0
"An Act to repeal Art. 72 of the Code, title 'Oysters,'
and to reenact the same with amendments."'"
"An Act to repeal sec. 183, Article 81, Code of Public
General Laws of Maryland, title, Revenue and Taxes,
sub-title, Tax on Mortgages, and to reenact the same
with amendments." 52
Ch. 263 of the Acts of 1890; Gans v. Carter, 77 Md. 1, 10 (1893).
"Ch. 247 of the Acts of 1894; Baltimore City v. Keeley Institute, 81 Md.
106, 117 (1895).
8 Ch. 358 of the Acts of 1876; Second German American Building Asso. v.
Newman, 50 Md. 62, 67 (1878).
4O Ch. 108 of the Acts of 1878; State v. Fox, 51 Md. 412, 415 (1879).
5O Ch. 362 of the Acts of 1888; State v. Norris, 70 Md. 91, 95 (1889).
"Ch. 380 of the Acts of 1894; State v. Applegarth, 81 Md. 293, 303 (1895).
52 Ch. 794 of the Acts of 1906; Miller v. Wicomico County, 107 Md. 438,
444 (1908).
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"An Act to repeal section 205 of Article 93 of the
Code of Public General Laws (as said section stands
in the Code of 1904), title 'Testamentary Law,' sub-
title 'Inventory and List of Debts,' so far as said sec-
tion applies to the City of Baltimore; and a new section
to Article 4 of the Code of Public Local Laws, title
'City of Baltimore,' sub-title 'Register of Wills,' to
follow sections 354 and to be designated as section
354A."53
The use of this form of title is perhaps the most definite
way of all to avoid question as to its validity, for if its
numbers and Code references are correct it cannot be mis-
leading. However, while it may show the general subject
it does not explain the precise purpose of the bill, so that
it has a practical disadvantage for persons who want a
quick explanation of the bill from its title.
C. Combination titles
The third general style of titles is that which combines
the first two. It gives the appropriate references to the
Code, and then adds a general description to show what
the bill is designed to accomplish. Examples of this form
are as follows:
"To repeal ch. 193 of the Act of 1872, and reenact
the same with amendments, so that oysters sold in
the shell at Baltimore, Crisfield, and at all packing
establishments, shall be measured in an iron
measure."
54
"An Act to repeal sections 119, 122, and 123 of
Art. 8 of the Code of Public Local Laws, title 'Cecil
County,' sub-title 'County Treasurer,' and to reenact
the same with amendments, providing for the election
of a treasurer of said county in 1895, and his appoint-
ment in the meantime."55
Most of the acts now passed by the General Assembly
have titles more or less similar to the latter one above;
the work of the Department of Legislative Reference dur-
52 Ch. 118 of the Acts of 1908; Barron v. Smith, 108 Md. 317, 327 (1908).
The words "'to add" were omitted from the latter part of this title.
6',Ch. 221 of the Acts of 1874; McGrath v. State, 46 Md. 631, 634 (1877).55 Ch. 25 of the Acts of 1894; Drennan v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 316 (1894).
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ing the past thirty years has done much to standardize
procedure in this respect.
A minor variation from this sort of title was found
in Ch. 124 of the Acts of the First Special Session of 1936:
"An Act to repeal and reenact, with amendments,
Sections 104-A, 105, 105-A, 106, 108, 115, 116, 118, 119,
120, 124, 126 and 127 of Article 81 of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, 1935 Supplement, title 'Revenue
and Taxes,' sub-title 'Inheritance Tax,' and to add a
new section to be known as Section 132-A, and to
follow immediately after Section 132, said new section
providing for reciprocity with other states in respect
to the collection of the inheritance tax and similar
taxes upon the estates of non-resident decedents."56
Here the descriptive matter at the end referred only to
part of what preceded it, but since that first part would
have been complete without the latter, there was no
question as to the validity of the whole.
There is no compelling reason why the two parts of
such titles should be in the order illustrated above, with
Code references first and general description following.
However, there seems to have been only one case involving
such a title in which that order was not followed,
where the two parts of the title were arranged in what
now might be called an "inverted" order:
"An Act regulating the loan of money, when, as
security for such loan, a lien is taken upon household
furniture and effects, musical instruments, typewriters
and sewing machines, in use or located in any dwelling
house, by repealing and reenacting with amendments
section 7 of Article 49 of the Code of Public General
Laws, title 'Interest and Usury,' as the same was re-
enacted by Chapter 404 of the Acts of the General
Assembly of Maryland, passed at its January Session
in the year 1900.""
In Drennen v. Banks there was a title with two parts,
giving first the Code references and secondly the general
description of what the act was to accomplish. Notwith-
56 Mylander v. Connor, 172 Md. 329, 331 (1937).
' Ch. 208 of the Acts of 1902; State v. King, 124 Md. 491, 498 (1915).
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standing that either of these two parts would of itself
have been a sufficient title, it was argued that the combina-
tion of the two parts resulted in one being qualified by
the other, producing a restricted title not broad enough
to cover many of the provisions in the bill. The Court
did not accept this contention, Judge McSherry writing
of it as follows:
"Two universal propositions, and it is immaterial
whether their universality be metaphysical, physical
or moral, whose subjects are taken according to their
entire extension, because the propositions are uni-
versal, can never be equivalent to a particular proposi-
tion. If one be contrary of the other they may be
mutually nullified; but they cannot by being used
together, result in a particular proposition. So like-
wise, the two general titles of the Act continue to be
general though used together, and do not become more
restrictive than either would singly be."'58
This seems to have been the only contention that Code
references and general descriptive matter are logically
restrictive or incompatible.
VI. "ONE SUBJECT"
Before testing whether the subject-matter of an act
was properly described in the title, the Court of Appeals
frequently has considered the subject itself, under the
Constitutional requirement that every law "shall embrace
but one subject." In only a few instances has an act been
declared invalid because of embracing more than one
subject.
The first ruling as to subject was in the well known
Davis case, it being that the Constitution does not require
a law to "embrace and dispose of the whole subject to
which it relates .... Few laws, if any, could stand such
a test."5
The basic liberal interpretation of the subject clause
was in the Parkinson case, in 1859. The title in question
58 Drennan v. Banks, 80 Md. 310, 318 (1894).
59
'Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854).
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was "An Act to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors in
the City of Annapolis, or within five miles thereof, to
minors and people of color." The body of the act pro-
hibited the giving as well as the sale of liquors, and it
was contended that since "give" and "sell" are not the
same, the act embraced more than one subject. The Court
held, however, that the evident intention of the Legislature
was to prohibit certain classes of persons from obtaining
intoxicating liquor, and that this was the one subject of
the act. The Court reviewed how bills of a "multifarious"
character frequently were passed by the Legislature, be-
fore, the title provisions were placed in the Constitution,
and continued:
"Whilst it is certainly proper that this provision
should be so construed as to prevent a repetition of
the evils which it was designed to prohibit, it is no less
proper to avoid the opposite extreme, the necessary
effect of which would be, in many instances, greatly to
embarrass the Legislature in the discharge of their
duties, and would also be calculated to produce much
controversy in regard to the validity of many laws."
And, said the Court, in a single sentence which has in-
teresting possibilities for application,
"What is the subject of a penal law may generally
be perceived, by ascertaining what mischief or evil
the law was designed to remedy or to prevent."6
In Annapolis v. State the title was "An Act to amend
and alter the charter of the City of Annapolis." A part of
the act which ratified acts done and ordinances already
passed concerning the closing of a street was declared
not to be foreign to the subject-matter as declared by
the title, particularly as the act concerned among other
things the future power to discontinue streets.61
A similar decision as to a county charter was given in
State v. Fox. The title of the act in question was "An Act
to add an additional Article to the Code of Public Local
80 Ch. 55 of the Acts of 1858; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184, 194 (1859).
'Ch. 240 of the Acts of 1867; Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112, 119 (1869).
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Laws to be entitled Garrett County." It was evident,
said the Court, that the purpose of the Legislature was
to frame an entire system of local laws for Garrett County,
which had just been formed, and that this was the one
subject with which the law dealt.62
"To render a law obnoxious to the clause of Art. 3,
sec. 29 of the Constitution," said the Court in 1878, "there
must be engrafted upon a law of a general nature, some
subject of a private or local character, or two or more
discordant or dissimilar subjects must be legislated upon
in the same law. '63 Another statement of general principle
was made about the same time in Baltimore City v. Reitz:
"If several sections of the law refer to and are germane
to the same subject-matter, which is described in the title,
it is considered as embracing but a single subject, and as
satisfying the requirements of the Constitution in this
respect." To the argument in that case that one section
was discordant and dissimilar to another, it was added:
"Had it been enacted as a separate law, its validity could
not be denied. If the two sections are not so discordant,
that they would be effective and valid as separate laws,
why cannot they both be embraced in the same Act-
especially as they both refer to the same general subject
of public squares or parks" Also, it was said, a new policy
of the law does not introduce a new subject.6 4
Acting on these broad principles, the Court of Appeals
has approved a wide variety of titles.
An interesting example of how "one thing leads to
another" and how a number of phases of the same subject
may be included in the same act was shown in Catholic
Cathedral v. Manning. It involved an act designed to give
Baltimore City power to open streets through a cemetery.
It therefore repealed prior acts forbidding that to be done.
Then, it necessarily made provisions for the removal of
the remains interred where the streets would be located.
And, since the location of streets might make other parts
62 State v. Fox, 51 Md. 412, 415 (1879).
63 County Commissioners v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 41 (1878).
6,Baltimore City v. Reitz, 50 Md. 574 (1879).
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of the property unsuited for cemetery purposes, there
was provision for removing the remains from these other
sections which would not actually be used for streets.
Finally, since the City would not want this extra land,
it was given the power to convey it. All this, said the
Court, was germane to the subject, which is not to be
confused with the mere details of interdependent acts
prescribed by the statute and authorized to be done in
carrying into effect the subject-matter itself.65
The law at issue in Price v. Liquor License Commis-
sioners showed similarly the flexibility of the concept of
"subject." The title was "An Act to enable the registered,
qualified voters of Cecil County to determine by ballot
whether spirituous or fermented liquors shall be sold in
said county." The act provided alternative sets of sections
to be in effect, depending upon the outcome of the refer-
endum. Some of these sections provided for a Board of
Liquor License Commissioners, empowered to issue licenses
to qualified applicants if the referendum decided in favor
of the sale of liquors. This was all held to be within the
same subject-matter.66
Again in Queen Anne's County v. Talbot County the
word "subject" was liberally construed. The title in ques-
tion was "An Act to limit and control the expenditure of
money upon public highways by the County Commis-
sioners of Talbot County." In the body of the act the
Commissioners were prohibited from levying taxes to
construct or maintain any bridge not wholly or partly
within the county. The Court held that this act embraced
only one subject.67
In a very recent case there was involved an act which
repealed a local law relating to Montgomery County and
enacted a new section to be added to Article 57 of the
Annotated Code. The new section applied to three counties,
including Montgomery, and was similar to the local law
05 Catholic Cathedral v. Manning, 72 Md. 116, 133 (1890).
'"Ch. 532 of the Acts of 1898; Price v. Liquor License Commissioners, 98
Md. 346, 352 (1904).
67 :Ch. 300 of the Acts of 1902; Queen Anne's County v. Talbot County, 99
Md. 13, 20 (1904).
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which was repealed. The Court of Appeals held that the
local law and the general law were germane and were
properly included within the same act.68
In a score or more other cases it has been contended
that some act combined two subjects, but the Court has
ruled otherwise. Usually there has been only a brief state-
ment of the general principle, with little or no discussion
of the particular facts involved.
In a few instances acts have been declared invalid
because of embracing more than one subject, and in others
it has been indicated that some particular set of facts, if
it existed, would have rendered an act invalid.
In Ellicott Machine Co. v. Speed there was involved
a title reading "An Act to provide for the payment of
the wages and salaries due employees of insolvent em-
ployers." In the body of the act, it was provided that
any wages or salaries due from any person or body
corporate should be a preferred claim if the person or
body corporate should make an assignment for the bene-
fit of creditors or should be adjudicated as an insolvent.
The trial court had held on these facts that the act had
subjected corporations to the insolvent laws, although
theretofore it had been clear that the insolvent laws
referred only to natural persons. This holding was over-
ruled, the Court of Appeals saying that if the Legislature
had intended to subject corporations to the insolvent laws,
in addition to providing for the payment of wages and
salaries as a preferred claim, the act then would have em-
braced more than one subject and would have been in con-
flict with the Constitution.69.
The first act to be declared unconstitutional for em-
bracing more than one subject was Ch. 513 of 1890, the
case being Scharf v. Tasker. The title was "An Act to
provide for the assessment of the unclaimed military lots
and tracts of land in Allegany and Garrett counties, and
for the collection of State and county taxes thereon by
6" Ch. 809 of the Acts of 1943; supra, n. 14, 598.
61 Ch. 383 of the Acts of 1888; Ellicott Machine Co. v. Speed, 72 Md. 22,
25 (1889).
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selling the delinquent lands and turning the proceeds into
the State treasury." In one section of the act it was
provided that in order to enable the county authorities
to trace and define the titles to these untaxed lands in
time for the assessment, they might have free access to the
records in the Land Office; and there was the further
provision that the fees charged to Garrett County for
certain searches previously made in the Land Office
should be remitted.
The Court pointed out that the general laws of the
State had a schedule of fees which the Land Office was
entitled to demand and receive, and that the present act
worked at least an implied repealer of this schedule as
to these particular searches. Accordingly, it said, this
proposed repealer was not germane to the main purpose
of the act. Also, the remission of former charges against
Garrett County was held to have nothing to do with the
object and purpose of the statute. The act of 1890 there-
fore was ruled unconstitutional and void.70
The case of Curtis v. Mactier construed the title of Ch.
382 of 1910, "An Act to incorporate the village of Chevy
Chase." One section of the act authorized and directed
the County Commissioners of Montgomery County, upon
the petition of the residents of a specified part of the
village, to impose a special levy thereon for certain public
services, the money to be paid over and spent by the
Chevy Chase Improvement Association. "It certainly re-
quires no argument," said the Court, "to demonstrate the
proposition that the levying and appropriation of taxes
by the County Commissioners in the manner indicated
is a different subject from the incorporation of a village.
The act under consideration manifestly undertakes to
legislate upon two wholly distinct subjects."'"
In Berlin v. Shockley, in 1938, Chief Judge Bond was
construing Article 16 of the State Constitution, as to what
laws are or are not referable under the referendum pro-
visions. He raised in passing the question whether the
70 Ch. 513 of the Acts of 1890; Scharf v. Tasker, 73 Md. 378 (1891).
1'Ch. 382 of the Acts of 1910; Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 394 (1911).
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association in a single enactment of a referable law with
another not referable would be an attempt to embrace
more than one subject in a single act.72
The requirement in Section 29 of Article 3 of the
Constitution that each act embrace but one subject has
been liberally construed, it is clear from the cases; and
only when an act clearly embraces two or more subjects
will it be declared invalid.
VII. "DEsclmED IN ITS TITLE"
The main question before the courts in construing
titles has been to ascertain whether the subject of an act
has been accurately and sufficiently described in its title.
As has been said, the Court of Appeals has given a liberal
interpretation to this constitutional provision, requiring
principally that the title not be misleading and that it
put interested persons "on notice" as to the contents of
the act. Frequently, as part of its liberal interpretation,
the Court has said that by the use of leads contained in
the title, or by applying a sort of logic to what is there,
the true meaning could be discovered by the reader; this
could be construed as a tacit admission that some of the
titles approved by the Court have on their face not been
entirely clear.
In the first case involving a title after the title require-
ments were written into the Constitution of 1851, the
title was "An Act relating to the trial of facts in the several
circuit courts of the State." The question was whether
the Superior Court of Baltimore City was to be included
within the operation of the act. The Court of Appeals
held that it should be included, reasoning as follows:
"The Superior Court is certainly one of the courts
of one of the judicial circuits of the State: Baltimore
City being by the 8th section of the 4th article of the
Constitution made the fifth judicial circuit: There-
fore, the Superior Court being a court of one of the
judicial circuits of the State, may be regarded in the
ordinary interpretation of language, as one of the
71 Berlin v. Shockley, 174 Md. 442, 446 (1938).
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circuit courts, within the meaning of the title of the
law. The Superior. Court would be clearly embraced
by the general language employed in the body of the
law, and there being no direct repugnancy with the
terms of the title, we must regard this court as within
the operation of the act. This view seems to accord
with good sense and reason. ' '17
One of the landmark cases on titles is County Commis-
sioners v. Meekins, decided in 1878. It concerned the title
of Ch. 160 of 1878, which was as follows:
"An Act to repeal sections 87 and 90 of Article 10
of the Code of Public Local Laws, title 'Dorchester
County,' sub-title 'County Commissioners,' enacted
by the act passed at January session, 1870, chapter
449, and all other sections or parts of sections of the
Code of Public General Laws and Public Local Laws,
and 'all other acts and sections, of the acts of the
General Assembly of Maryland, inconsistent with the
provisions of this act, and to enact the following in
lieu thereof: . . ."
The descriptive clause "to enact the following in lieu
thereof" is the most obviously unorthodox and questionable
part of this title. In addition, the earlier act of 1870 had
not actually enacted any sections numbered 87 and 90.
The 1870 act had added two sections to the local laws of
Dorchester County, and the only numbers used were as
sections 1 and 2 of the bill.
The Court of Appeals split on the sufficiency of this
title, with the majority holding it valid. Two main reasons
were given by the majority. First, "any member of the
Legislature, upon reading the title, would at once be in-
formed that the County Commissioners, their powers and
duties formed the subject to be dealt with by the act."
Then, on the point that sections 87 and 90, which were to
be repealed, had not been passed as such, the majority
said:
"It is true that the Act of 1870 did not enact its
provisions as sections 87 and 90, but it is evident from
a reading of the Act and of sections 87 and 90, which
"Ch. 325 of the Acts of 1854; Wright v. HaInner, 5 Md. 370, 375 (1854).
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were repealed by it, that section two was intended
to take the place of section 87 ... and the first section
to take the place of section 90 of the local code ...
This intention was so evident, that in the Code of the
laws of that session, prepared by Messrs. Cohen and
Rowland, section two of the act has been codified as
section 87, and section one as section 90 in the Local
Code. '7 4
Judges Bowie and Alvey dissented in the Meekins case,
with the latter writing the dissenting opinion. If the con-
stitutional provisions as to titles are to have any force,
he said, it is "too plain for argument" that the act of 1878
and its "remarkable" title are a nullity, because of their
"utter disregard" of the constitutional requirement. Judge
Alvey went on to point out the variety of matters which
were covered in the act of 1878. It contained twenty-one
sections, providing for re-districting the county, the duties
of the Commissioners, the appointment of a County Treas-
urer by the Governor, the duties of the Treasurer, the
appointment by the Treasurer of tax collectors, the collec-
tion and reporting of State taxes, and suits on the bonds
of defaulting collectors. This title, he concluded, "not
only fails to give a description, but leaves the mind wholly
uninformed, even beyond the aid of the imagination, as
to what subjects are embraced in the newly enacted law." 5
A few months later the Court had before it Ch. 314 of
1876, having this title: "An Act to repeal the act passed
1874, chapter 276, relating to Kent Narrows, and all pre-
ceding acts relating thereto, and to reenact as follows."
Judge Alvey wrote the opinion, and while he thought it
a bad title he accepted the ruling of the Meekins case
as controlling. 6
About the same time the Court decided Second German
American Building Association v. Newman, concerning a
title which read "An Act to amend Art. 95, of the Code of
Public General Laws, by adding an additional section
1 -Ch. 160 of the Acts of 1878; County Commissioners v. Meekins, 50 Md.
28, 43 (1878).
,5 Ibid, 46-48.
76 Ch. 314 of the Acts of 1876; Talbot County v. Queen Anne's County, 50
Md. 245, 255 (1879) ; see also Baltimore City v. Stoll, 52 Md. 435 (1879).
[VOL. IX
LEGISLATIVE TITLES
thereto." The Court pointed out that Article 95 contained
the laws on usury, and that the new section was on the
same subject. Accordingly, the title was declared valid.
The Meekins case was cited as decisive of the present one.
77
In Prince George's County v. Laurel the title "An
Act to incorporate the Town of Laurel in Prince George's
County" was held broad enough to cover provisions in
the act for maintaining streets in the town, with tax
monies collected by the County Commissioners and turned
over to the town.7s
There was a holding of some potential importance in
Maryland Agricultural College v. Keating, concerning the
titles of two appropriation acts, each being "An Act mak-
ing appropriations for the support of the State Govern-
ment for the fiscal year ending. . . ." The two acts had
appropriated to the Maryland Agricultural College, respec-
tively, $5,999. and $5.00, though the act which had estab-
lished the college in 1856 had set the annual appropriation
at $6,000. The Court held that the clauses in the two acts
making appropriations to the college were not so foreign
to the subject of the acts, as indicated in their titles, as to
violate the Constitution.79
A highly subtle argument was made against the title
at issue in Hamilton v. Carroll. The title was
"An Act to provide for the removal of the county
seat of Charles County from Port Tobacco to La Plata
or Chapel Point, if the legal and qualified voters of
said county shall so determine, and to provide for the
erection of a court house and jail, at such place as
shall be so determined on and the procuring of a site
or sites for the same, and to authorize the County
Commissioners of said county to borrow money and
issue bonds for the payment therefor."
The act provided for a referendum, the question submitted
being whether the county seat should be located at La
" Ch. 358 of the Acts of 1876; Second German American Building Asso.
v. Newman, 50 Md. 62, 67 (1878).
, Ch. 260 of the Acts of 1870; Prince George's County v. Laurel, 51 Md.
457, 460 (1879).
79,Chs. 431 and 432 of the Acts of 1880; Maryland Agricultural College
v. Keating, 58 Md. 580, 584 (1882).
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Plata or Chapel Point. The argument advanced was that
while the title indicated the voters would have a chance
to vote on the question of removing the county seat from
Port Tobacco, the actual question submitted by the act
was only on the location of the new county seat, as between
La Plata or Chapel Point.
The Court termed this argument "a refined and subtle
distinction" not within the spirit of the constitutional
provision on titles, yet the opinion devoted more than two
pages to refutation. There can be but one county seat,
it was reasoned, and a vote to place the county seat at
either La Plata or Chapel Point necessarily was also a
vote to remove it from Port Tobacco. Also, the destruction
by fire of the court house at Port Tobacco made that place
seem no longer desirable as a county seat, and the only
question was whether it should thereafter be located at
La Plata or Chapel Point. "It was so dealt with by the
Legislature," said the Court, "and so understood by the
people of the county." The title therefore was held to be
valid.80
Another close argument was made on the title of Ch.
381 of 1898, being "An Act to provide for the establishment
of an electric light plant in Hagerstown, Maryland." The
contention against the title was that there was nothing in
it to show that the electric light plant was to be established
by the municipality itself. The title was held to be valid.
The worst that can be said about the act, said the Court,
is that the title does not specify by whom the plant is to
be constructed; and while it does not indicate that it was
to be a municipal plant, there also is nothing in the title
to lead anyone to believe that it was to be established
by some private corporation. And, it was further reasoned,
the incorporation of electric light companies was covered
by a general law, so that the Legislature could not in any
event have been passing a special act for such an incor-
poration. Therefore, "would anyone with the knowledge
of the existing law (and the members of the Legislature
and others are presumed to have knowledge of it) be
11 Ch. 546 of the Acts of 1894; Hamilton v. Carroll, 82 Md. 326, 334 (1896).
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misled into the belief by the wording of that title that
it was not the municipality that the authority was to be
given to?"'"
There was similar reasoning in Barron v. Smith. The
title being construed was:
"An Act to repeal section 205 of Article 93 of the
Code of Public General Laws (as said section stands
in the Code of 1904), title 'Testamentary Law,' sub-
title 'Inventory and List of Debts,' so far as said sec-
tion applies to the City of Baltimore; and a new
section to Article 4, of the Code of Public Laws, title
'City of Baltimore,' sub-title 'Register of Wills,' to
follow section 354 and to be designated as section
354A."
The act provided for the appointment of appraisers for
the estates of decedents. The Court held the title to be
valid, saying that the portion of it which referred to
the repeal of a public general law "can be taken to aid in
throwing light upon the subject to be dealt with in the
new section to be added in the local code for Baltimore
City."8
2
In Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co. there was involved
an act from which a number of counties were exempt,
though from the title it appeared to be a State-wide law.
The title was:
"An Act to repeal and reenact Section 4 of Article
100 of the Code of Public General Laws, as enacted
by Chapter 317, Acts of 1894, title 'Work-Hours of,
in Factories,' regulating the employment of children."
In the body of the act there was a list of counties to which
it was not to apply, and it was contended that the title
was misleading in that it said nothing about these excep-
tions from the act. However, the Court held the title
to be valid, pointing out that much legislation was enacted
81'Ch. 75 of the Acts of 1900; Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 741, 743
(1901).
Is Ch. 118 of the Acts of 1908; Barron v. Smith, 108 Md. 317, 327 (1908).
The words "to add" were omitted from the last part of this title.
19481
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
in this State with one or more counties excepted, and
that there had never been any serious question of its
constitutionality.8
The title of Chapter 635 of the Acts of 1908 was to
amend one section of Article 77, on the subject of public
education, and to add six new sections to that Article,
"designed to provide a commercial course in certain
approved high schools." One of these new sections pro-
vided for increased salaries for public school teachers,
according to their period of service. Judge Urner, in
writing the opinion, conceded that the question of the
validity of the title "is not at all free from difficulty,"
but the title was declared valid. He pointed out that
while everything in the act, including the pay raise,
was included in the general subject of public education,
the descriptive matter in the last clause of the title tended
to restrict the purpose of the statute to a more narrow
phase of this subject-matter. However, this was held
not to be such a flagrant disregard of the Constitution
as would warrant declaring the title invalid.84
Another possibly misleading title was at issue in
Ruehl v. State. Chapter 594 of the Acts of 1916 had
increased the fees for liquor licenses. The title had a
clause at the end providing "for the payment of the
increases provided for to the Treasurer of the State, for
the general purposes of the State." This part of the
title, it was contended, gave the impression that the
State was to get all the increase; the act, on the other
hand, provided that the increase was to be distributed
in the same manner as the former license fees, meaning
that part was to be paid to the localities, so that the
State could not get the full amount of the increase. The
Court held the title to be valid, citing the case of
Worchester County v. School Commissioners for the
proposition that there was here not such a flagrant dis-
" h. 566 of the Acts of 1902; Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co., 111 Md.
561, 568 (1909).
"Ch. 635 of the Acts of 1908; Worcester Co. v. School Commissioners,
113 Md. 305, 308 (1910).
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regard of constitutional principles as to require invali-
dating the title.85
Similarly, in Crouse v. State, there was concerned
the title to Chapter 340 of the Acts of 1916, "providing
for the creation by popular vote of anti-saloon territory
within Carroll County." It was contended that this
language in the title described an act to create anti-
saloon territory in the various sub-divisions of the county,
while the act itself submitted the question "shall this
county become anti-saloon territory?" The Court held
the title to be valid, being "susceptible of a meaning
that brings the title into harmony with the constitutional
provision."86
There is a good example in State v. Case of the Court
bringing in facts outside the title, and its own logic, in
validating a title. Chapter 704 of the Acts of 1916 had
provided in its title, among other things, for the licensing
of construction firms or companies. In the body of the
act the licensing requirement was as to "any person,
firm or corporation." The question was whether the
title covered the licensing of a "person." The title was
held valid, the Court saying:
"We are of the opinion that the question is settled
by Section 7 of Article 1 of the Code, being one of
the rules of interpretation. It is as follows: 'The
singular always includes the plural, and vice versa,
except when such construction would be unreasonable.'
The word 'firms' as used in the title is the plural
of 'person' and, under the rule, includes it, if to so
construe it is not unreasonable. That it is not unrea-
sonable is apparent from the scope of the whole act.
In fact, it would be unreasonable to suppose that the
Legislature, in providing for an increase in the revenue
of the State, through additional license fees, would
have intended to tax firms and corporations for the
privilege of constructing buildings and at the same
time allow individuals to exercise the same righi
free of cost."8 7
'5 Ch. 594 of the Acts of 1916; Ruehl v. State, 130 Md. 188, 192 (1917).
h. 340 of the Acts of 1916; Crouse v. State, 130 Md. 364, 372 (1917).
87 Ch. 704 of the Acts of 1916; State v. Case, 132 Md. 269, 273 (1918).
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The same title also provided for the licensing of "cash
registers and adding machines," while in the body of the
act the license requirement was imposed upon persons
displaying cash registers and adding machines for sale.
The title was declared to be valid also in this respect,
on similar reasoning:
"It is true that the expression, 'licensing cash
registers and adding machines,' is an awkward and
inaccurate one; but when considered in connection
with the place where it is found and in relation to
the wording of the entire title, and taking into con-
sideration the general knowledge of the uses of such
machines, it is difficult to believe that it could have
deceived any one. . . . The only possible meaning
that 'licensing cash registers and adding machines'
could have other than that contained in the body
of the act would be licensing the possession or use
of them. As such a tax would have been as unrea-
sonable as a license tax on the possession of a piano
or cook stove it is not to be supposed that meaning
would be attributed to the expression, especially under
the sub-title of the Code, 'Traders.' "188
In Dean v. Slacum this title was upheld:
"An Act to add a new section to article 10 of the
Code of Public Laws of Maryland, title 'Dorchester
County,' said section to be known as section 185CC,
to follow immediately after section 185C of said
article, and to be under sub-title 'Fish.'"
The sub-title indicated the general subject of the legisla-
tion, the Court said, and the omission of the word "Local"
from the reference to the Code could not have caused
any doubts that the Code of Public Local Laws was meant,
in view of the other descriptive terms employed.8 9
In the State Office Building Bond Bill the title called
for issuing bonds in an amount "not exceeding" one
million dollars, while in section 2 of the act provision
was made for issuing the bonds in series "until the entire
amount of one million dollars shall have been issued."
8 Ch. 704 of the Acts of 1916; Adding Machine Co. v. State, 146 Md. 192,
197 (1924).89 Ch. 495 of the Acts of 1924; Dean v. Slacurn, 149 Md. 578, 580 (1926).
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The Court held that the act did not require the issue of
the full one million dollars in bonds, so that there was
no mis-description in the title.90
In a recent case the act incorporating the town of
College Park was at issue. The title was as follows:
"An Act to incorporate the town of 'College Park'
and the adjacent communities of 'Calvert Hills,'
'Lakeland,' and the adjacent town of 'Berwyn' in
Prince George's County, Maryland, as a municipal
corporation to be known as 'Town of College Park,'
and to define its boundaries."
As originally drafted the act set up and defined four
districts. The bill was amended in the Legislature by
adding a Fifth District, but no change was made in the
title. The Court held the title to be valid, ruling that the
Fifth District was included in what was generally known
throughout the community as the town of Berwyn, so
that the original title was sufficient.91
These cases illustrate the liberal interpretation which
the Court of Appeals has brought to the constitutional
requirements as to titles, and the Court's willingness
on occasion to apply its reasoning to what is there, or
to take a sort of judicial notice of other facts, in order
to spell out the validity of a title. Using such an approach,
the Court has ruled valid most of the titles which have
been questioned, but in some twenty instances has held
them to be invalid.
VIII. INvALID TITLES
The first title to be declared invalid was that of Chapter
403 of the Acts of 1880, reading as follows:
"An Act to repeal an Act passed at the January
Session, 1872, ch. 363, entitled 'An Act to...."
Although the title said only that an earlier statute was
to be repealed, the act also enacted affirmative legislation.
9 °Ch. 368 of the Acts of 1937; Bickel v. Nice, 173 Md. 1, 5 (1937).
91 Ch. 1051 of the Acts of 1945; Duvall v. Hess, 52 A. (2d) 108 (1947).
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The title was held to be misleading, and the act was held
unconstitutional and void insofar as it attempted to enact
affirmative legislation; however, the repeal of the earlier
statute was in strict conformity with the title and there-
fore valid.2
In Whitman v. State the title of the act in question
indicated that the act was "to regulate" the liquor traffic
in the town of Cambridge. The act went on, however,
to prohibit entirely sales by pharmacists in an area larger
than Cambridge. Because regulation does not mean total
abolition, and because of the greater geographical area
involved, that section of the act having to do with sales
by pharmacists was declared invalid. 8
Chapter 536 of the Acts of 1890 provided in its title
"for the payment by every newly incorporated company
of a bonus on its capital stock." There was the further
provision in the body of the act that corporations previ-
ously created also should pay a bonus on every increase
in capital stock. The Court held that the title was defective
and misleading as to this provision for existing corpora-
tions, and that the part of the act concerning existing
corporations was unconstitutional.9 4
In the title'of Chapter 505 of the Acts of 1898 there
was provision for "licenses for stevedores." The part
of the act which concerned licenses was declared valid,
but further provisions requiring each stevedore to give
a bond were held unconstitutional since they were beyond
the object of the statute as declared in the title. "
A case which frequently is cited in discussions of titles
is Luman v. Hitchens Bros. Co., in which this title was
at issue:
"An. Act to prohibit railroad and mining corpora-
tions, their officers and agents, from selling or barter-
ing goods, wares or merchandise in Allegany County
to their employees."
92 Ch. 403 of the Acts of 1880; Stiefel v. Md. Institution for Blind, 61 Md.
144, 148 (1884). See also State v. Benzinger, 83 Md. 481 (1896).
93 Ch. 484 of the Acts of 1894; Whitman v. State, 80 Md. 410, 418 (1895).
9, Ch. 536 of the Acts of 1890; State v. The Schultz Co., 83 Md. 58, 62
(1896).
95 Ch. 505 of the Acts of 1898; Steenken & Berkmeler v. State, 88 Md. 708,
711 (1898).
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The body of the act contained a section entirely to prohibit
any such company from doing a merchandise business
in the county, and in addition had another section making
it unlawful for any officer of any such corporation to
own or have any interest whatever in any store or
merchandise business in Allegany County, both without
reference to whether sales were made only to the em-
ployees of railroad and mining corporations. Chief Judge
McSherry, writing the opinion, pointed out that "there
are two things prohibited in the body of the act under a
title indicating a purpose to do but one thing; and that
one thing is a wholly different thing from the two which
are prohibited. . . . No one reading a title which was
confined to a prohibition against particular persons selling
to their employees would ever infer that the thing actually
prohibited in the act itself was a sale by those persons to
anyone." Accordingly, the act was held to be void.96
In Kafka v. Wilkinson there was this title to be con-
strued:
"An Act to repeal secs. 122 and 128 of Art. 23
of the Code of Public General Laws, title 'Corporations,'
sub-title 'Insurance,' and to reenact the same with
amendments; and to add an additional section to
said Article to be known as sec. 122A; and to repeal sec.
143EI of said Article."
In the body of the act secs. 122 and 128 were amended,
sec. 122A was added, and then there was a section 122B
added. The Court held this last section to be void; not
only was it not described in the title, but the title had
indicated that only one new section was to be added.9"
The title of Chapter 212 of the Acts of 1904 was as
follows:
"An Act to add an additional section to Article
81 of the Code of Public General Laws of Maryland,
title 'Revenue and Taxes,' sub-title 'Payment of Taxes
by Corporations,' to follow sec. 81A and to be desig-
nated as sec. 81B."
O6 Ch. 493 of the Acts of 1898; Luman v. Hitchins Bros. Co., 90 Md. 14, 23(1899).
97 Ch. 338 of the Acts of 1902; Kafka v. Wilkinson, 99 Md. 238, 243 (1904).
See also Baltimore City v. Williamson, 124 Md. 502 (1915).
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In the enacting clause, however, the additional section
was enacted to follow section 86A and to be known as
section 86B. There was at the time no section 81A in
the Article, and section 81 concerned a subject not the
same as the newly enacted section. This title, it was
held:
"does not fairly advise the Legislature and the people
of the real nature of the legislation sought to be
accomplished by the passage of the act. If the title
had stopped with the designation of the Article, title
and sub-title to which the additional section was
to be added we would have been authorized to hold
it sufficient.... But the title goes further and locates
the new section to be enacted as a sub-section of
No. 81 to follow 81A, and to be designated as 81B.
As there was at the date of the passage of that act
no section 81A, in Article 81, and section 81 of that
Article related to . . . a subject wholly foreign to
the purpose of the new section to be enacted that
reference in the title tended to create a false impression
as to the purpose of the act."
The act was therefore held to be void."8
In State v. Cumberland and Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., there was concerned the title of an act to amend the
railroad's charter as to its power to connect with the
trackage of another company. Section 1 of the act made
the change, in conformity with the title, but sections 2
and 3 then went on to provide how the company might
lose it charter if it did any of the things prohibited by
section 1. These two latter sections, said the Court,
would have accomplished a change in the general cor-
poration laws, and since the title had no mention or
intimation of such a change the two sections were held
to be invalid. 9
Following the destruction of two of the State's
five tobacco warehouses in the Baltimore Fire of 1904,
98 Ch. 212 of the Acts of 1904; State v. German Savings Bank, 103 Md.
196, 201 (1906).
!9 'Ch. 257 of the Acts of 1906; State v. Cumberland and Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 105 Md. 478, 485 (1907).
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the Legislature passed Charter 804 of the Acts of 1906,
which from its title was to authorize the Board of Public
Works to collect insurance upon the two buildings (known
as No. 1 and No. 2), to re-build a warehouse on the same
site, or to build upon another site to be chosen by it. In
the body of the act, however, there was created a State
Tobacco Warehouse Building Commission, with power
to re-build and enlarge warehouses 3, 4, and 5, and to
build a new warehouse either on part of the site of No.
3 or elsewhere. The Court held that between the title
and the body of the act there was a clear difference as
to what was to be done and the agency to do it, and the
act was declared void.100
The title "An Act to incorporate the Pocomoke Bridge
Company" was held not to cover one section of the act
which required the county commissioners of two adjoin-
ing counties to make annual payments to the company.
This one section was held invalid.101
Similarly, the title "An Act to incorporate the village
of Chevy Chase" was held not broad enough to cover a
section in the act which gave to the county commissioners
of the county sole taxing powers in a designated part of
the village. If only this section were held invalid, the
Court pointed out, there would be no taxing power any-
where over this excepted district, a result which the
Court felt the Legislature could not have desired. Accord-
ingly, the whole act was held unconstitutional.0 2
Another case which frequently is cited is Nutwell v.
Anne Arundel County, in which this title was construed:
"An Act to add two new sections to Article 2 of
the Code of Public Local Laws, title 'Anne Arundel
County,' sub-title 'Roads,' so as to require all owners
of vehicles using public streets and roads in Anne
Arundel County to have a license therefor."
100 Ch. 804 of the Acts of 1906; Christmas v. Warfield, 105 Md. 530, 545
(1907).
101 Ch. 14 of the Acts of 1865; Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Com-
pany, 109 Md. 1 (1908).
"
2
'6Ch. 382 of the Acts of 1910; Curtis v. Mactier, 115 Md. 386, 399 (1911).
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Although the title seemed to require licenses of "all"
vehicles, the body of the act exempted ox carts, horse
carts, farm wagons, and milk wagons from the license
provisions. Also, the act provided that any vehicle so
licensed should be relieved from the payment of any
other tax upon it. Since these two important forms of
exemptions were not described in the title, it was held
to be misleading. And, since the tax exemption feature
was inseparably connected with the whole scheme of the
act and the Court felt the act probably would not have
been passed without it, the entire act was held invalid.103
Chapter 345 of the Acts of 1912 also was held to have
a misleading title. It established a Good Roads Commis-
sion in Baltimore County and provided for a program
of road building, with the title containing this further
provision as to financing "and providing also the ways
and means for the construction and improvement thereof
by a bond issue of one million five hundred thousand
dollars... ." In the body of the act, however, the County
Commissioners were made responsible for salaries and
administrative expenses, and for damages assessed against
the Good Roads Commission. This title, said the Court,
diverted public attention from a great and indefinite lia-
bility imposed upon the taxpayers, in excess of the sum
mentioned. "It is a glaringly false, deceptive and mis-
leading title." and since to take out only the bad features
of the act would result in its mutilation and emasculation,
the entire act was declared unconstitutional and void. 0 4
Another tax matter was at issue in Weber v. Probey.
The title of Chapter 250 of the Acts of 1914 had specified
that the town of Mt. Rainier could levy taxes on the assess-
able property of the town, in order to redeem bonds
authorized for sewer construction. In the body of the
act, however, assessments upon abutting property owners
were authorized. The title was held to be misleading, and
10o :Ch. 672 of the Acts of 1908; Nutwell v. Anne Arundel County, 110 Md.
667, 672 (1909).
101 Ch. 345 of the Acts of 1912; Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 480
(1913).
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since all of the provisions of the act were closely connected
the entire act was invalid.
0 5
Perhaps the oddest opinion as to titles is in Shea v.
State, construing this title:
"An Act to repeal and reenact, with amendments,
Sections 332, 333, 334, 336, 339 and 340 of Article 3
of the Code of Public Local Laws of Maryland, title
'Baltimore County,' sub-title 'Liquor and Intoxicat-
ing Drinks,' as codified by T. Scott Offutt Esq., regu-
lating the manufacture and sale of certain alcoholic
and fermented beverages."
The trial court had held this title did not comply with the
requirements of Article 3, Section 29 of the Constitution.
The Court of Appeals held this decision to have been cor-
rect, with no discussion,"°6 so that it is not possible to
judge the merits of the case. The appellee's brief had
contended the title was misleading because the body of
the act concerned alcoholic beverages which had less
than 3 % of alcohol by volume, these being declared
in the act to be "non intoxicating beverages within the
meaning of the Eighteenth Amendment."
In a recent case there was involved an act creating
the office of police justice in Prince George's County,
which official was given exclusive jurisdiction in motor
vehicle cases. This would have caused for that county a
material change in the general laws of the State, which
gave jurisdiction in such cases to the nearest justice of
the peace. No mention of this change had been made in
the title of the act. The title was held invalid. "When the
Legislature undertakes to make any material change in
any existing law, local or general," said the Court, "there
should be some reference to the act to be amended or
repealed, under section 29 of article 3 of the Constitution,
so that the public may be put on notice of the contemplated
alteration or repeal of existing laws."'07
lOB Ch. 250 of the Acts of 1914; Weber v. Probey, 125 Md. 544, 553 (1915).
See also Culp v. Chestertown, 154 Md. 620 (1928) ; United Railways and
Electric Co. v. Baltimore City, 121 Md. 552 (1913).
100 Ch. 350 of the Acts of 1920; Shea v. State, 148 Md. 256 (1925).
107 Ch. 426 of the Acts of 1927; Quenstedt v. Wilson, 173 Md. 11, 22
(1937).
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Since the Court has given every presumption of validity
to the titles it has construed, and has declared them invalid
only when it could see no alternative, those cases in which
titles have been ruled unconstitutional seem to be well
reasoned and not open to question.
IX. EFFECT OF INvALIDITY
Once a title has been found to be misleading, and
invalid, the further question remains whether the act
should be declared unconstitutional in whole or only in
part. As has been seen in the cases described in the
preceding section, the Court of Appeals follows the general
rule that only so much of a statute as necessarily or reason-
ably is invalid, should be held unconstitutional; and if
there is any fair possibility of saving part while rejecting
another part, that will be done.
The Court first set up this principle in a title case in
Davis v. State:
"We are not prepared to say, that a whole law,
otherwise constitutional would be rendered void by
the introduction of a single foreign or irrelevant sub-
ject into it, and where such subject was not indicated
in the title. In such a case the irrelevent matter
would be rejected as void, while the principal subject
of the law would be supported, if properly described
in the title. But if an Act of Assembly, be composed
of a number of discordant and dissimilar subjects,
so that no one could be clearly recognized as the
controlling or principal one, the whole law would
be void. 1 0 8
This statement has frequently been repeated or para-
phrased in subsequent cases. Chief Judge Boyd said
similarly in 1908:
"It is well settled that it is not necessary to strike
down an entire act because one provision is void,
'unless the provisions are so connected together in
subject-matter, meaning or purpose, that it cannot
be presumed the Legislature would have passed the
one without the other'."'10 9
108 Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151, 160 (1854).
109 Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Company, 109 Md. 1, 8 (1908).
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And in Painter v. Mattfeldt, the Court gave this quota-
tion from a Massachusetts case:
"The constitutional and unconstitutional provisions
may even be contained in the same sections, and yet
be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first
may stand, though the last fall. The point is, not
whether they are contained in the same section, for
the distribution into sections is purely artificial; but
whether they are essentially and inseparably con-
nected in substance." 110
The doctrine that a statute may be in part constitutional
and in part unconstitutional had an interesting modifica-
tion in United Railways and Electric Co. v. Baltimore City,
where a title was ruled ineffective only insofar as it affected
certain companies. The titles at stake were those of
Chapter 401 of 1906 and Chapter 202 of 1908 which, among
other things, authorized the assessment of paving costs
against abutting property owners. The body of the latter
act provided that the Railway Company should repave
between their tracks, which would have constituted, the
Court held, an amendment to the Company's charter,
without the title having given notice of any such contem-
plated change. "Our conclusion is," said the Court, "that
this section 8 is not invalid but that it does not apply to
those companies upon which the obligation to repair only
existed.""' The title would be valid and effective, that
is, as to any company not having contrary provisions in
its charter.
X. MISCEL.ANEOUS
In its many discussions of titles the Court of Appeals
has made case law on a variety of uses and applications
of titles in particular fact situations.
110 Painter v. Mattfeldt, 119 Md. 466, 475 (1913).
"I Ch. 202 of the Acts of 1908; United Railways and Electric Company v.
Baltimore City, 121 Md. 552, 561 (1913).
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A. Use of the title in
construing the act
It is well established that a title is not a part of the body
of law enacted by a statute, but it is frequently said in
Maryland that a title may be used in helping to construe
the substantive part of the act. The earliest pronounce-
ment seems to be in an old case decided nearly twenty
years before the title requirements first were put into
the Constitution of 1851, in which Chancellor Bland
appeared to give favorable regard to a statement made
earlier by Chief Justice Marshall. "It is laid down in some
of the books," wrote Chancellor Bland, "that in constru-
ing a statute, the title (being no part of it,) is not to be
regarded, but we have high authority in this country for
a different rule of construction, ' 1 2 his reference being
to the case of United States v. Fisher, a Supreme Court
decision. Marshall had written in that opinion:
"Where the mind labours to discover the design
of the legislature, it seizes everything from which
aid can be derived; and in such case the title claims
a degree of notice, and will have its due share of con-
sideration." ' s
In another early Maryland case it was said that
"The title of the act, and the preamble to the act,
are, strictly speaking, no part of it, though they may
be resorted to in explanation of the enacting clause,
if it be doubtful; or to restrain its generality, when
it would be inconvenient if not restrained. This is
the whole extent of the influence of the title and
preamble in the construction of a statute.""'
In Maxwell v. State ex rel Baldwin,1 5 in 1874, there
in an indication in the dissenting opinion that a title
may properly be considered in construing an act. Later,
in State v. Archer, the principle was clearly applied:
112 Canal Co. v. Railroad Co., 4 G. & J. 1, 90 (1832).
United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386.
"' Lucas v. MeBlair, 12 G. & J. 1, 17 (1841).
" Maxwell v. State e-- rel. Baldwin, 40 Md. 273, 306 (1874).
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"So, if there be any doubt as to the precise meaning
of the language used in the body of the act now before
us, which we by no means concede, yet, when con-
strued in connection with this title, we are forced
to the conclusion that. . .
Again, in Levin v. Hewes,
"Legislative enactments are not to be defeated on
account of mistakes, errors or omissions, provided
the intent of the legislature can be collected from
the whole statute. If a mistake in the act of the
legislature renders the intention doubtful, the Courts
may look to the title and preamble, as well as the
body of the act for assistance in determining such
intention. 117
In a very recent case involving the construction of a
statute the Court quoted from the title and then went on
in the opinion to say that "the ordinary and natural import
of this language in the titling it that .... ,,18 Similarily,
in Miggins v. Mallott, it was said that "the title, therefore,
in conjunction with the body of the act, brings out with
resounding clarity the patent intent, purpose, and effect
of the amending statute in no uncertain manner.""' Here
were two practical applications of the principle that a
title may be considered in the construction of the body
of the act.
Conceivably the use of a title in construing the body
of an act could raise some question under that part of
Section 29 of Article 3 of the Constitution which says
"nor shall any law be construed by reason of its title to
grant powers or confer rights which are not expressly
contained in the body of the act." This provision has
apparently never been construed by the Court of Appeals.
118 State v. Archer, 73 Md. 44, 61 (1890). See also Henderson v. Mary-
land Home Insurance Co., 90 Md. 47, 52 (1899) ; Bond v. Baltimore City,
116 Md. 683, 687 (1911).
11 Levin v. Hewes, 118 Md. 624, 634 (1912). See also Baltimore City v.
Deegan, 163 Md. 234, 238 (1932).
118 Barrett v. Clark, 54 A. (2d) 128, 133 (1947).
110 Miggins v. Mallot, 169 Md. 435, 440 (1936). See also Levering v. Super-
visors, 137 Md. 281, 290 (1920).
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B. Use of the act in
construing the title
There are two cases in the Maryland Reports that may
indicate a disposition on the part of the Court to use the
body of the act in the interpretation and application of
the title. The point must be advanced very tentatively,
as it may involve giving more import than is warranted
to a few words from the opinions.
The title in question in State v. Case was to impose
a license tax upon construction firms or companies, while
the body of the act required the tax from persons, as
well as from firms and corporations. The Court held that
as by a statutory rule of construction the singular always
includes the plural, and vice versa, the word "firms" in
the title might properly be held to include the word
"persons" in the body of the act. Then, it continued, that
this construction "is not unreasonable is apparent from
the scope of the whole act.'120
The other example is in another case concerning the
same title, and it is even more obscure. The title also
mentioned the licensing of "cash registers and adding
machines," while the body of the act imposed the license
tax upon persons displaying for sale cash registers and
adding machines. The Court held that although the title
might have been phrased more accurately, it was not
actually misleading, and anyone reading it could hardly
have been deceived. For, it was said, "the only possible
meaning that 'licensing cash registers and adding ma-
chines' could have had other than that contained in the
body of the act would be licensing the possession and
use of them. As such a tax would have been as unreason-
able as a license tax upon the possession of a piano or
cook stove, it is not to be supposed that meaning would
'p121be attributed to the expression ....
120 State v. Case, 132 Md. 269, 273 (1918).
12' Adding Machine Co. v. State, 146 Md. 192, 197 (1924).
[VOL. IX
LEGISLATIVE TITLES
C. Subsequent validation of a title
Titles which may originally have been invalid may
subsequently be cured, so that the law enacted can be
applied without question. Perhaps the best example,
more important formerly than now, is to have the law
confirmed by having it included in a Code adopted by
the General Assembly. Thus, when the title of Chapter
233 of the Acts of 1874 was questioned, the Court did not
consider its provisions at any length, for, it said, these
sections of the act "were adopted and confirmed by the
act of the Legislature adopting the Code.' 1 22 The reference
was to the Code of 1888, which was adopted by the General
Assembly. The same point could be made as to every-
thing contained in the Code of 1860, which also was adopted.
Since 1888, however, the several editions of the Annotated
Code have simply been legalized and made evidence of
the law, so that the inclusion of a statute therein would
not cure a defect in its original title.
In Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co., an act passed in
1894 was amended in 1902, with the title of the latter act
referring specifically to the former. It was contended that
the title of the 1894 act was bad, and that since the 1902
act was based upon the earlier one it also must fall. On
this point the Court said:
"There would be much force in this contention
if the title of the act of 1894 was defective, and the
title of the act of 1902 simply referred to the title
of the former act, for in that case as the title of the
former act was insufficient the title of the latter must
also fail to give proper notice of the legislation pro-
posed. But... if an act contains in its title a sufficient
description of the subject of the act its validity is not
affected by the fact that it also proposes in its title
to repeal and reenact, and does repeal and reenact
an act the title of which was defective, nor is it
dependent in any sense for its validity upon the act
so repealed and reenacted.' '123
122 Bond v. State, 78 Md. 523, 525 (1894). See also Baltimore City v. Wil-
liams, 124 Md. 502, 516 (1915) ; State v. Coblentz, 167 Md. 523, 526 (1934);
State v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 171 Md. 584, 599 (1937).
1I Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co., 111 Md. 561, 567 (1909). See also
State v. King, 124 Md. 491, 501 (1915).
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In a more recent case, Toomey v. Shipley, there was a
series of three related acts and titles in question, with
all three being held valid..2
An act held invalid by reason of a misleading title is
not validated by having been approved by the voters
at a referendum 124a
D. Surplusage in a title
A title will not be held invalid simply because it indi-
cates something is in the body of the act, which in fact
is not there. The extra matter is simply rejected as
surplusage. In a strict sense, of course, such a title is
misleading, but by a sort of damnum absque injuria reason-
ing the Court holds that no one has been too seriously
misled; though the Court has never expressed it in these
terms, perhaps the distinction is between a negative mis-
leading and a positive misleading, with only the latter
rendering an act invalid.
In Strauss v. Heiss, the act in question had revised the
corporation laws. The title, in addition to other matters,
purported to repeal Sections 99-103 of Article 16 of the
Code. These sections related to equity proceedings and
had nothing to do with corporations; the Court thought
that the reference should have been to these section
numbers in Article 75. In any event, there was nothing in
the body of the act repealing these sections in Article 16.
The title was held valid, the Court saying:
"The mere fact that part of the title of an act
referes to a subject-matter foreign to, and inconsistent
with, other parts of the title, and which finds no cor-
responding provision in the body of the law, would
not in itself render the act invalid. In such a case,
so much of the title as was repugnant to, and incon-
sistent with, the act would be rejected as mere sur-
plusage.' 12
5
What might loosely be called surplusage also appears
in titles which indicate the act is to be State-wide in
121 Toomey v. Shipley, 172 Md. 463 (1937).
124, Culp v. Chestertown, 154 Md. 620, 631 (1928).
125 Strauss v. Heiss, 48 Md. 292, 297 (1878).
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application and effect, while in fact they operate only in
part of the State. Chapter 566 of the Acts of 1902 had in
its title the stated purpose of regulating the employ-
ment of children, but nothing was said in the title as to
the exemption of a number of counties from the operation
of the act. The title was held valid, the Court pointing
out that much legislation was enacted in Maryland in
this way and that no serious question of constitutionality
ever had been raised. 12 A subsequent case gave the same
opinion as to a title which appeared to be on a State-wide
bill, though actually the act was to be effective in Bal-
timore City only.127
A recent case involved Chapter 809 of the Acts of
1943, part of the title of which was "specifying the time
within which counties and municipalities of Maryland
must be notified of claims for damages and the method of
giving such notice." Though nothing was said in the title
as to any territorial restriction, the act actually applied
only to Caroline, Montgomery and Prince George's
counties. The Court held the title valid, since it was
broader than the body of the act.128
E. User does not create validity
An act with an invalid title cannot be cured simply by
long adherence to the act as though it were valid. In
Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Company, the title
"An Act to incorporate the Pocomoke Bridge Company"
was held not to cover a provision in the body of the act
that two counties make annual payments to the bridge
company. And, said the Court, "the long acquiescence by
the county, in paying the amount for so many years, can-
not stop the present County Commissioners from raising
the question, and thereby make an unconstitutional law
in effect constitutional.12 9
126 Mt. Vernon Co. v. Frankfort Co., 111 Md. 561, 568 (1909).
12" Church Home v. Baltimore City, 178 Md. 326, 334 (1940).
12 Neuenschwander v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission, 48 A.
(2d) 593, 600 (1946).
112 Somerset County v. Pocomoke Bridge Company, 109 Md. 1, 7 (1908).
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Again in Baltimore City v. Williams, it was contended
that long observance of a statute as valid should prevail
against arguments as to its invalid title, but the Court
said it could find no authorities in support of such a
proposition.130
F. Emergency clause
A title need not specify that the act has an emergency
clause, to make it effective when passed. Such a conten-
tion was made in Dinneen v. Rider, but the title in question
was held valid. "The sufficient reply to this," said the
Court, "is that the time the act became effective was not
its subject-matter, but simply the time when the act
became operative as a law."''1
G. Constitutional amendents
The title provisions in Section 29 of Article 3 of the
Constitution do not apply to bills proposing amendments
to the Constitution, it was held in Hillman v. Stockett.
The wording of this section makes clear that it applies
only to acts, as distinguished from bills, and a title can-
not be invalid until the bill has become an act. "It is only
when it has finally passed, and become a law in one of
the methods above set out, that section 29 becomes opera-
tive upon it. That section, therefore, can never become
operative upon a bill proposing a constitutional amend-
ment, and such a bill is not subject to its provisions.' '18 2
H. Suit on title must be held to its facts
When a suit is brought contesting the validity of a
title in relation to some particular section of an act, the
inquiry must be confined to the sufficiency of the title for
this one section. If the title is sufficient for the validity
of the section in question, it will be upheld, even if in-
sufficient for the remainder of the act.183
1SO Baltimore City v. Williams, 124 Md. 502, 516 (1915).
131 Dinneen v. Rider, 152 Md. 343, 358 (1927).
132 Hillman v. Stockett, 183 Md. 641, 647 (1944).
131 -Baltimore City v. Perrin, 178 Md. 101, 111 (1940).
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I. Res judicata
The case of Holt v. Moxley was brought in the Circuit
Court of Prince George's County, contesting a local law
applying to the town of Brentwood, on the ground that
its title was insufficient. The defendants cited that in a
previous case in the same court, involving them and
other plaintiffs of the same class, the act had been ruled
valid, and no appeal had been taken from that decision.
The present plaintiff answered that he had had no knowl-
edge of the prior suit, so that he could not have intervened
in it. On appeal, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrines
of class representation and res judicata, in holding that
the issues raised in the present case were foreclosed by
the decree in the prior case.'
J. Substitute bills
The validity of a substitute or "bob-tail" title and
bill was upheld in Thrift v. Tower. The bill had been
introduced in the Senate, and then was completely re-
written by a committee amendment adopted on second
reading, by "striking out everything after the words 'a
bill entitled.'" It passed second and third readings in
the Senate and all three readings in the House in its
amended form. However, the outside page of the bill
continued to bear the original title, and all the Journal
entries showed the bill under its original title. It was
contended, therefore, that in all its readings in both houses
the bill was read and passed under its original title. The
Court agreed that if this had occurred the act must be
declared void, as no bill could have been validly passed
under the original title to accomplish what the amended
bill was designed for. But, said the Court, there is no
requirement in the Constitution that the title shall appear
on the outside wrapper of a bill, and a properly authen-
ticated act cannot be impeached by the Journals alone.
Competent and clear evidence that only the original act
was read would be required, it was continued, and there
was no such evidence here. Also, "in dealing with the
134 Holt v. Moxley, 157 Md. 619 (1929).
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question here presented it must be borne in mind that
there is a wide distinction between taking up an act
which has been passed by the Legislature, comparing it
with the Constitution, and declaring whether its provisions
are in accord with that instrument or not, and looking
into the details of the method of procedure by the legisla-
tive bodies in passing the act and the regularity of the
steps they took in so doing.' '18 5
K. Baltimore City ordinances
The Charter of Baltimore City has in it a requirement
for ordinances passed by the City, which is practically
identical with the title provisions for legislative acts,
in the Constitution. The City Charter says that
"Every ordinance enacted by the City shall embrace
but one subject, which shall be described in its
title. .. "186
This has been construed by the Court of Appeals in about
a dozen cases, and not unnaturally the Court has applied
to it the same principles as it has established for Section
29 of Article 3 of the Constitution.'87
Xl. PosTscRIPT
Probably no court has ever decided 152 cases in con-
struing and applying a narrow point of law without leav-
ing itself open to the charge of inconsistency somewhere
along the line. Probably also among the Maryland cases
involving the titles to legislative acts there are those which,
it could be submitted, are not consistent, one with the
other.
The Court of Appeals has been enforcing our title
requirements for nearly a century, with no change in the
basic principles applied. One of these principles has been
1"5 Thrift v. Towers, 127 Md. 54, 61 (1915).
116 Baltimore City Charter (1946), Sec. 28 [1938 Ed., Sec. 303].
137 Clark v. Baltimore City, 29 Md. 277 (1868) ; Baltimore City v. Stewart,
92 Md. 535 (1901) ; Gould v. Baltimore City, 120 Md. 534 (1913) ; State v.
Gurry, 121 Md. 534 (1913); Baltimore City v. Wollman, 123 Md. 310
(1914) ; Mogul v. Gaither, 142 Md. 380 (1923) ; Smith v. Standard Oil Co.,
149 Md. 61 (1925); Baltimore City v. Bloecher & Schaaf, 149 Md. 648
(1926) ; Douty v. Baltimore City, 155 Md. 125 (1D28) ; Liberto v. Baltimore
City, 180 Md. 105 (1941); Brooklyn Apartments v. Baltimore City, 55 A.
(2d) 500 (Md. 1947).
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that of liberal construction, under which a title will not
be held invalid if it can be given a construction to make
it valid. Without laboring over possible minor aberrations,
a word may be said as to this approach.
Since there has been a studied effort to hold titles
valid, it has followed that most of the questionable titles
have been held valid, and that when a title was so faulty
as to be held unconstitutional there has not been much
reason for questioning the decision.
As a result, those cases in which titles have been held
invalid make as a class clearer and simpler and more
convincing reading than do the cases in which titles have
been upheld. When the Court, in the process of upholding
a title, has had to apply to it its own extensive reasoning,13
or has said that one of the rules of interpretation in Article
1 of the Code might by enlisted to explain the title,"'
it may be answered in return that the purpose of the
Constitutional provision was to make every title clear
upon its face. And, when the Court's opinions have
said that there is no "direct repugnancy" between a title
and the body of an act, 4 ' or that the subject-matter of
the act was not "so foreign" to the title as to make it bad,""
or that an admitted variance between a title and the body
of the act was not such a "flagrant disregard" of the Con-
stitution as to warrant holding the title invalid,'4 2 it
may be asked in return whether the Constitution permits
any repugnancy, or foreign matter, or disregard of its
provisions.
One may wonder, therefore, whether the application
by the Court of Appeals of the title provisions in Section
29 of Article 3 of the Constitution has not been both a
little more complicated and a little less strict, than was
envisaged by the several constitutional conventions which
added these provisions to the Maryland Constitution.
Is As in County Commissioners v. Meekins, 50 Md. 28, 43 (1878) ; Hamil-
ton v. Carroll, 82 Md. 326, 334 (1896) ; Mealey v. Hagerstown, 92 Md. 741,
743 (1901).19 .State v. Case, 132 Md. 269, 273 (1918).
140 Wright v. Hamner, 5 Md. 370, 375 (1854).
141 Maryland Agricultural College v. Keating, 58 Md. 580, 584 (1882).
'"Worcester County v. School Commissioners, 113 Md. 305, 308 (1910);
Ruehl v. State, 130 Md. 188, 192 (1917).
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